T he most important force shaping the U.S. health care system over the coming decades may well be the federal debt. The government now pays for approximately half of all health care costs in the United States, and projections of growing federal debt largely reflect anticipated increases in health care spending. Because federal debt and health care policy in the United States are so deeply entwined, it is important to understand the basics of deficits and debt and their implications for health care reform.
The deficit is the gap between expenditures and revenues in any given year ($1.4 trillion in the United States in 2009), whereas debt is defined as accumulated past deficits, or the stock of what we owe ($7.5 trillion at the end of 2009). 1 Economists distinguish between two types of deficit: cyclical and structural. Cyclical deficits rise or fall in the short term in response to economic conditions. In economic downturns, tax revenue falls and government spending on public programs such as unemployment insurance increases, leading to larger deficits and higher debt. These deficits are not necessarily a problem: they can boost economic activity and mitigate economic downturns. When the economy expands, revenues rise and spending falls, creating a cyclical surplus that, holding all else constant, can reduce the debt.
In contrast, structural deficits represent an underlying, persistent imbalance between revenues and expenditures. The United States has a substantial, growing structural deficit, much of which reflects current and projected increases in federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid.
This federal health care spending amounted to 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 20% of federal outlays in 2009 and is forecast to reach 12% of the GDP by 2050. 1 Health care spending is thus a key driver of long-term debt. This does not mean that we cannot run a structural deficit, but deficits must be small enough that debt grows more slowly than the GDP.
So why does debt matter, and how much is too much? Economists often measure the size of the debt relative to the overall economy, or the debt-to-GDP ratio. public programs. Second, growing debt can lead to higher interest rates for all borrowers (government, businesses, and individuals), thus impeding economic growth. Finally, high debt reduces our capacity to respond to sudden economic shocks and magnifies the detrimental effects of any deficit. Economies can bear substantial debt without dire economic consequences, but there is a limit to how high debt can rise and still be financed without causing serious economic harm. Economists, however, do not agree on where the threshold lies. The European Union has set a target debt-to-GDP maximum of 60% for its member countries (although the table shows that a number of them exceeded this threshold in 2008 2 ), but some economic research suggests that levels approaching 90% can be managed without substantial economic harm. In 2009, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio was 53%, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Although this figure suggests that we have some short-term flexibility, our large and increasing structural deficits will push us past the 90% mark by the end of 2020, absent major policy changes. 1 The consequences of high debt levels depend on the treatments that policymakers prescribe. One approach is generating inflation to erode the value of the debt, but the adverse economic consequences of this strategy can be severe. Another option is raising taxes. Taxes reduce economic growth.
Projections made by the Congressional Budget Office in 2007, before the current fiscal crisis began, suggest that to finance federal spending, the highest federal tax bracket would have to rise to 92% by 2050, assuming health care spending grows 2.5 percentage points faster than GDP, which is approximately the historical average. 3 A final option is cutting spending on valued public programs. For Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, this approach could mean large increases in cost sharing, poorer benefits, limited eligibility, and diminished access. For health care providers, it could mean drastic reductions in Medicare and Medicaid payments.
Most likely, some combination of tax increases and spending cuts will be needed to avoid unsustainable debt, but the higher our debt climbs, the more likely it is that we will find ourselves in an economic crisis and the more painful the unavoidable response will be. The economic stresses apparent in Greece and in California provide some glimpse into what such a fiscal Armageddon might bring.
The clear implication for health care reform is that as we evaluate options (or the possibility of maintaining the status quo), we should focus on the path to a sustainable fiscal situation rather than on short-run deficits. Growth in health care spending is one of the primary contributors to increases in debt over the long run, so the long-term strategy must involve slowing that growth. The current reform proposals incorporate a number of promising strategies for controlling spending and raising revenue (see box 4 ). The impact of these strategies will depend on the details and the effectiveness of implementation, and no one knows which strategies will prove successful. Projections suggest that the reform package, including additional revenues, will reduce the deficit (relative to the unsustainable baseline).
If the entire reform package is required in order to achieve the deficit reduction -perhaps because of an interaction between expanded coverage and the fiscal effects of reform or perhaps because expanded coverage is needed to generate sufficient support for passage -then the fiscal case for reform is much stronger. However, if the provisions for cost savings and revenue gains can be implemented without expanding coverage, we must ask whether the money saved should be spent on coverage expansions (or any other policy goal) or on debt reduction. The net impact of reform on the deficit should not be the metric of fiscal virtue. If all the money saved through reductions in future spending on existing health care programs were devoted to new health care programs, our fiscal situation would be little improved. Similarly, if other fiscal tools, such as tax increases, are used to cover new programs, those tools will not be available to achieve broader reductions of the structural deficit. Thus, although covering the uninsured is a laudable policy goal that would improve access to health care for many, it would also add substantially to our structural spending and thus necessitate more draconian fiscal austerity elsewhere.
This does not mean that we should not expand coveragebut rather that we must evaluate the cost of doing so in the context of the extent to which it will limit our options to address our broader fiscal imbalances, recognizing that the challenge posed by these imbalances is Herculean. Even if we halve the gap between the growth in health care spending and the growth in the GDP, some estimates suggest that our debt-to-GDP ratio would drop only from 300% to 200% by 2050. 5 The goals of health care reform must therefore be addressed in light of our short-term and long-term fiscal situation. Our current debt is manageable, and we can afford projected deficits for several years, but our structural deficits place us on a path of debt growth that is unsustainable, largely because of health care programs. The sooner we start to rein in health care spending, the less painful the changes may be (since slowing spending now will help us avoid drastic cuts in the future), and the more time we will have to find the most effective strategies. Physicians and the health care community must play a strong role in this process, preparing their practices for the inevitable changes that will come as we address spending growth and helping to identify clinically informed strategies that permit quality to improve in an environment of slower spending growth.
